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The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960's
Brian E. Forst*
The debate over capital punishment, which for centuries has
been waged over essentially nonempirical matters, has focused
more recently on the extent to which executions prevent (or en-
courage) homicides. Interest in this aspect of capital punishment
was considerably heightened when, in the amicus curiae brief sub-
mitted in Fowler v. North Carolina,' the Solicitor General of the
United States cited statistical evidence2 reported by Professor
Isaac Ehrlich supporting the hypothesis that capital punishment
deters murder.3
Before vacating and remanding Fowler,4 the Court received
briefs and heard oral arguments in five other death penalty
cases,5 in which the deterrence question, as before, figured prom-
inently.6 Soon afterward, the Court ruled that "the punishment
of death does not invariably violate the Constitution,' 7 and stated
that for many murderers "the death penalty undoubtedly is a
significant deterrent. '8
* Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for Law and Social
Research, Washington, D.C. The author is deeply indebted to the follow-
ing persons for their helpful comments: Anthony Amsterdam, Hugo
Bedau, Frank Easterbrook, Shelby Haberman, William Hamilton, Law-
rence Klein, Jeffrey Roth, and Hans Zeisel. Funding for this project was
provided by the Lilly Endowment. The author assumes full responsibil-
ity for any errors.
1. 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
2. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 35-38.
3. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Ques-
tion of Life or Death, 65 Am. Ecox. REv. 397 (1975).
4. 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
5. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 34-45, 9a-16a.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). But see id. at
231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d
676, 682-85 (Mass. 1975).
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976). Although the
Court did not support its belief in the deterrent value of capital punish-
ment with empirical evidence, this evidence was not ignored;
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The Supreme Court is by no means alone in its belief that
capital punishment deters crime. Eighty-four percent of the
respondents to a 1977 National Observer plebiscite supported
restoration of the death penalty, and belief in the deterrent effect
of capital punishment was the reason most often cited.9 Public
support for the death penalty has been similarly revealed by the
Gallup Poll1° and other opinion surveys."
Belief in the deterrent value of the death penalty, however,
is less common within the academic community. While support
for Ehrlich's research exists,1 2 replications of his analysis13 have
shown that his evidence of deterrence depends upon a restrictive
assumption about the mathematical relationship between homi-
"Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may
not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penal-
ties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refut-
ing this view." Id. at 185 (footnote omitted). Professor Hans Zeisel has
taken issue with this opinion, arguing that the evidence about the deter-
rent effect is, indeed, "quite sufficient" and that "the request for more
proof is but the expression of an unwillingness to abandon an ancient
prejudice." Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v.
Faiths, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 317, 318.
9. Egan, Plebiscite Results: Restore the Death Penalty, National
Observer, Jan. 29, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
10. During the decade ending in April, 1976, support for the death
penalty among Gallup Poll respondents rose from 42 percent to 65 per-
cent. Id.
11. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty,
26 STAN. L. Rsv. 1245, 1255 (1974) ("Belief in deterrent effectiveness is
probably the most frequently assessed rationale for support of capital
punishment.")
12. Although Tullock characterized Ehrlich's study of capital pun-
ishment as "sophisticated," the praise was qualified: "Unfortunately, the
data available for this study were not what one would hope for, so not as
much reliance can be put upon his results as one normally would give to
work by such a sophisticated econometrician." Tullock, Does Punishment
Deter Crime? 36 PuB. INTEREST 103, 108 (Summer 1974). Further sup-
port has been expressed in Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, Text
of the Will E. Orgain Lecture, University of Texas Law School at 15-19,
31 (March 1975) (on file at MINNESOTA LAw Rmviw).
13. See Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehr-
lich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Klein,
Forst, & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assess-
ment of the Estimates (paper commissioned by the National Academy of
Sciences, September 1976 draft, to appear in DETRENcE AND INcAPAcI-
TATION: ESTIMATING THE EMrCTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME
RATES (A. Blumstein ed. 1977) (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as
DETERRENCE AND INCAPAcTrATION]; Passell & Taylor, The Deterrent Effect
of Capital Punishment: Another View, Columbia University Discussion
Paper 74-7509 (March 1975), reprinted in Reply Brief for Petitioner at
App. E., Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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cides and executions, 14 the inclusion of a particular set of obser-
vations, 5 the use of a limited set of control variables,' 6 and a
peculiar construction of the execution rate, the key variable.17
This Article first discusses briefly the strengths and weak-
nesses of time-series and cross-section analyses to test the hypoth-
esis that capital punishment deters homicides. A method that
avoids the more serious of these weaknesses is then described
and applied to state data for 1960 and 1970 to test the above hy-
pothesis. The results of this initial test do not support the hy-
pothesis. To ensure that these findings reflect reality rather
than simply the way in which the key variable was measured,
alternative measures of the execution rate are substituted. Sim-
ilar attempts are made to eliminate other possible biases that
have been identified in the literature. None of these modifica-
tions of the basic model is found to alter the initial finding in
any important way. It is concluded that the evidence of the
1960's supports the theory that capital punishment does not, on
balance, deter homicides.
I. TIME-SERIES AND CROSS-SECTION STUDIES
Professor Ehrlich's landmark statistical test of the hypothesis
that capital punishment deters homicide consisted of a regression
analysis of aggregate data for the United States for the period
1933 through 1969.18 His basic approach is commonly referred
14. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 13, at 199-203; Klein, Forst, &
Filatov, supra note 13, at 31-32; Passell & Taylor, supra note 13, at 6-8;
note 33 inlra.
15. Ehrlich reported that his deterrence result remained when
data from the 1930's were excluded, Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 410, but
others found that the result disappeared when data from the latter part
of the 1960's were excluded. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 13, at 197-204;
Klein, Forst, & Filatov, supra note 13, at 26-28; Passell & Taylor, supra
note 13, at 5, 21, 22.
16. Klein, Forst, & Filatov, supra note 13, at 14-17, 28-30. Control
variables are used in the analysis of nonexperimental data to reduce the
danger of erroneous inferences about relationships between variables.
To the extent that the murder conviction rate influences both the ex-
ecution rate and the murder rate, for example, its omission from an an-
alysis of the deterrent effect of executions would produce the appearance
of an association between executions and homicides even if, in fact, no
association existed. See notes 21-23 infra and accompanying text. In
the present analysis this problem is recognized and controlled for. See
text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
17. See Klein, Forst, & Filatov, supra note 13, at 17-19.
18. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 406, 409. Regression analysis is a
standard statistical method for determining the mathematical equation
that best describes the relationship between a dependent variable (in
this case, the homicide rate) and one or more predictor variables. Ehr-
1977]
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to as "time-series analysis," since the units of observation con-
sist of a series of time intervals-in this case, individual years.
One of the crucial unresolved issues in Ehrlich's time-series
analysis centers around the sensitivity of his findings to the in-
clusion of data from the 1960's. Specifically, he found no deter-
rent effect when data for the period since 1964 were excluded
from the analysis. 19 This conclusion is not surprising, since
during the 1960's the murder rate rose precipitously, after dec-
ades of slow decline, while the use of capital punishment dimin-
ished until terminated in 1967;2o but it does raise the question
of the extent to which the key statistical relationship found in
Ehrlich's time-series analysis reflects a true causal relationship.
It is possible that the appearance of deterrence that emerges in
Ehrlich's time-series study is primarily the product of variables
omitted from the analysis, an omission due largely to the un-
availability of data.21  While all nonexperimental measure-
ments are subject to limitations, inferences about deterrence
drawn from the analysis of aggregate time-series data appear to
be especially prone to error because only a limited array of fac-
tors can be incorporated 22 or otherwise reflected2 3 to safeguard
against spurious findings.
lich's study was the first to estimate the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment by: (1) measuring factors other than the death penalty that
may have affected the homicide rate; (2) measuring the extent to which
the death penalty was used when it existed; and (3) attempting to
account explicitly for the reverse effect of homicides on the demand for
executions.
19. Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209,
217 (1975). This phenomenon was first reported by Passell & Taylor.
Passell & Taylor, supra note 13, at 5, 21, 22.
20. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NA-
TIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, table 2, at 18-19
(No. SD-NPS-CP-3, November 1975).
21. It is, of course, also possible that omitted variables caused his
finding to understate the true effect of executions on homicides.
22. A key variable not available on an annual basis is the average
term of imprisonment for persons convicted of homicide and not exe-
cuted. The potential importance of this variable lies in its role as a
substitute sanction for capital punishment. In an earlier study not based
on time-series data, Ehrlich himself found that this variable was an
effective homicide deterrent. Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate
Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. PoL-. EcoN.
521, 551 (1973). The aggregate number of homicide convictions, a central
variable in the analysis, is also not available annually. Aware of the
potential importance of this variable, Ehrlich constructed rough approx-
imations of its values from F.B.I. estimates of the annual number of
homicides, the annual probability of arrest, and the annual probability
of conviction given arrest. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 407.
23. One way of reflecting regional factors is with the use of binary
[Vol. 61:743
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Professor Ehrlich's second empirical test-based on a regres-
sion analysis of data for individual states, with separate results
for 1940 and 1950-has been cited to further support the theory
that capital punishment deters murder.24  This "cross-section"
technique has certain advantages over analysis based on aggre-
gate time-series data: it allows the researcher to observe larger
differences in the relevant factors,25 to control for specific re-
gional effects,26 and to include potentially important factors
about which information is not available on an annual basis.27
Several scholars have suggested that the existing estimates
of the deterrent effect of capital punishment can be improved
by analyzing data that reflect variation both temporally and
geographically.28  A method to accomplish this is set forth in
the following section.
II. CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS OF CHANGES
During the 1960's, after years of gradual decline, the hom-
icide rate for the United States as a whole increased sharply (see
Figure 1). Although the homicide rate in most states followed
this general pattern, it rose much more sharply in some states
regional variables in data that manifest geographical variation. See
notes 26 & 41 infra.
24. Ehrlich referred to these results in his reply to critics, Ehrlich,
supra note 19, at 213, 217, and reported them in Punishment and Deter-
rence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, a paper
delivered at the Joint Meeting of the Operations Research Society of
America and the Institute of Management Science, Las Vegas (November
17, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ehrlich, Punishment and Deterrence].
Since Ehrlich has described these findings as "preliminary and incom-
plete," id. at 1, they will not be discussed in detail here.
Professor Peter Passell has also performed a cross-state analysis of
the deterrent effect of capital punishment, with separate results for
1950 and 1960. His findings differ sharply from Ehrlich's; he con-
cludes that there is "no reasonable way of interpreting the cross-section
data that would lend support to the deterrence hypothesis." Passell,
The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 61, 80 (1975).
25. See note 69 infra.
26. Aggregation errors associated with the failure to account for
these effects are discussed in Baldui & Cole, A Comparison of the Work
of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170, 175-77 (1975).
27. See note 22 supra.
28. Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and
his Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359, 367 (1976); Zeisel, supra note 8, at 317, 336;
Bailey, Book Review, 67 J. CPnmr. L. & CRMINOLOGY 359, 360 (1976) (W.
BowERs, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA).
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than in others, and even declined in a few. 29 This cross-state
variation, coupled with the differences from state to state in the
rate at which use of the death penalty declined from 1960 to 1970,
Figure 1. The homicide rate in the United States, 1940-1970*
Homicides
per 100,000
residents
1940 1950 1960 1970
* Sources: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INDEX OF CRIME,
UNITED STATES, 1933-1972 (Special tabulation presented to the author in
March 1975; copy on file with MINNOTA LAw REVIEW).
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COIVnWEMCE,
THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 2, at 5 (1970).
29. From 1960 to 1970 the homicide rate increased in 43 states,
declined in five states (Alabama, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma, and Vir-
ginia), and was unchanged in two states (Nevada and North Dakota). It
increased mostly sharply in Missouri (from 4.6 homicides per 100,000
residents in 1960 to 10.7 in 1970) and New York (from 2.9 in 1960 to 7.9
in 1970). FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, table 3, at 38-52 (1960), & table 4, at 72-78
(1970).
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provides a unique opportunity to estimate the deterrent effect
of capital punishment on the commission of homicides. The
changes in these and other relevant variables that occurred be-
tween 1960 and 1970 in each state for which data are available
can be measured and used to estimate the average effect of re-
ductions in the execution rate on the rate at which homicides
occur in the population. To the extent that capital punishment
deters homicides, the homicide rate should have increased by the
largest amounts from 1960 to 1970, ceteris paribus, in those states
with the greatest reductions in the probability that a person con-
victed of murder would be executed.
Examining the data in this manner should overcome the po-
tentially serious problems associated with aggregate time-series
analysis.30 Analyzing intertemporal changes in the relevant var-
iables across states should also improve the estimates available
from conventional cross-section analysis,31 partly by reducing
biases associated with omitted variables. 32 Moreover, the results
of this approach appear less sensitive to alternative assumptions
about the mathematical form of the model that describes the rela-
tionships among the relevant variables than do those of either
the conventional time-series or cross-sectional approaches. 33 By
30. See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
31. The cross-section analyses by Ehrlich and Passell are based on
the levels of variables for individual census years. See note 24 supra
and accompanying text. These single-year lerels are used to estimate
the elasticity of the homicide rate with respect to the probability of exe-
cution, given conviction for murder. The elasticity of one variable, y,
with respect to another, x, is a number indicating the percentage increase
(a negative number indicates a decrease) in y that results from a one
percent increase in x. Ehrlich has estimated that the elasticity of the
homicide rate with respect to the probability of execution, given convic-
tion for murder, is around -0.06. Ehrlich, =pra note 3, at 414. Since
elasticity is a measure of the effect of a change in one variable on an-
other variable, estimating elasticities by analyzing actual changes in
variables in a cross-section of jurisdictions has considerably more ap-
peal than estimating them from the levels of variables for any given
year.
32. According to Klein, estimates based on cross-sectional data are
prone to errors of spatial heterogeneity, although in certain instances,
these errors can be eliminated by "differencing" two successive cross
sections. Specific biases that can be eliminated under this technique in-
clude the bias produced by the failure to measure personality effects in
samples of households and that produced by failure to measure entre-
preneurial effects in samples of business firms. L. KLEn, A TEXTBOOK OF
EcoNoMETRIcs 350, 358 (2d ed. 1974). Commenting on a draft of this
Article, Professor Klein suggested that interstate differences in social
values may constitute a class of effects that can be accounted for by
applying this method to cross-state data.
33. Whether the homicide rate is related to other factors in a linear
1977]
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estimating the differential of the homicide rate rather than the
parent relationship between the homicide rate and its deter-
minants, one can be sure of describing a function that is additive
in the differences of the explanatory variables.3 4
Applying this method of analysis to the 1960's is appealing
for other reasons as well. More control variables are available
for the most recent census years, and their measurement tends
to be more accurate than it was in 1940 or 1950. 3 5  Moreover,
there has been a great deal of controversy about the period from
or loglinear fashion is very much in controversy. Bowers & Pierce, supra
note 13, at 199-206; Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 406; Ehrlich, supra note 19,
at 217-19; Klein, Forst, & Filatov, supra note 13, at 31-32; Passell &
Taylor, supra note 12, at 6e-7e; Peck, supra note 28, at 360-61. Esti-
mates of the deterrent effect of capital punishment have been found to
be quite sensitive to whether the relationship is assumed to be linear or
loglinear. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
The assumption of loglinearity and the use of logarithms in previous
studies have created additional problems. During 1968, 1969, and 1970
there were no executions. Because it is impossible to take the logarithm
of zero, Ehrlich assumed that one execution took place in each of these
years so that he could use the loglinear model. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at
409 n.6. This procedure, however, builds biases into the analysis.
While the true relationship between the homicide rate and its deter-
minants may be nearly linear or nearly loglinear, it is likely, in fact, to
be precisely neither.
34. In regressing the change in the homicide rate on the changes
in the relevant independent variables, partial differential coefficients
rather than slope coefficients are obtained. Letting the homicide rate,
Q/N, be determined by the rate at which convicted murderers are
executed, E/C, and by other factors, X1, X2, .... the general relation-
ship is written as
Q/N = f(E/C, X1, X 2. . .
The differential of the homicide rate is of the form
N NEN
N a. C 6 X X
C
regardless of whether the parent function is linear, loglinear, or any
other continuous expression. Since the partial differential coefficients
will be constants only if the parent function is linear, the differential of
the homicide rate will not generally be a linear function. It will, how-
ever, be additive in the differences of the explanatory variables. Hence,
the regression coefficients produced in the estimate of the differential
equation may be viewed as approximations of the averages of the re-
spective partial differential coefficients over the range of observed
values.
35. Ehrlich has also suggested that more recent data are likely to
be better. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement,
1 J. LEGAL STUDiEs 259, 272 (1972).
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1960 to 1970 in the reviews of the available time-series evidence.
36
In short, analyzing changes during this decade cross-sectionally
would appear to permit one to discover more directly whether
the association between the cessation of capital punishment and
the upsurge in the homicide rate during the 1960's was primarily
causal or coincidental.
A. THE MODEL
The model that provides the initial structure for this analy-
sis is
(1) Q/N = f(E/C, C/Q, T, Cr, Age, NW, Male, Urb, Enr,
Pop, Div, Y, Pov, Emp, S).
This equation represents the notion that the homicide rate (Q/N)
is potentially influenced by the rate at which persons convicted
of murder are executed (E/C), the rate at which murders re-
sult in conviction (C/Q), the average prison term served by con-
victed murderers (T), the factors that determine the rate at
which crimes other than homicide are committed (Cr), social
and demographic characteristics [age (Age), race (NW), sex
(Male), urbanization (Urb), school enrollment rate (Enr), resi-
dent population (Pop), divorce rate (Div)], economic variables
[median family income (Y), proportion of families in poverty
(Pov), employment (Emp)], and a binary variable indicating
whether the state is southern (S). The sources of data for these
variables are given in the Appendix.
3 7
Professor Ehrlich has provided theoretical justification for
the inclusion of the criminal justice sanction variables and the
economic variables.3s The social and demographic variables have
been added to minimize the degree of spuriousness in the esti-
mates of central concern here, those reflecting the effects of
the sanction variables on homicides.39 The rate at which
36. See notes 15 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
37. See pp. 765-67 infra.
38. Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic
Analysis, in EssAys IN THE EcoNoMIcs OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 68, 70-
92 (G. Becker & W. Landes eds. 1974); Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 398-406.
39. Any factor that influences both the execution rate and the
homicide rate, if omitted from the analysis, will tend to distort the esti-
mated effect of executions on homicides. Age, race, sex, schooling, popu-
lation density and size, and family stability are all basic characteristics
that would appear to be capable of producing such distortion. Ehrlich
has incorporated the first five of these factors in his study of deterrence.
Ehrlich, supra note 38, at 93.
1977]
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crimes other than homicide are committed 40 and a binary South-
ern variable 4 1 are incorporated to capture the effects of addi-
tional exogenous factors that the other control variables do not
specifically measure. Values of each of these variables for 1960
and 1970 are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Aggregate United States values, mean state values and standard
deviations for the variables used in the analysis, 1960 and 1970.
Standard
U.S. total* State means(a ) deviations¢a)
1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970
Variable:
Q/Ncb)  5.1 7.8 4.7 6.6 3.2 3.7
E/C .0157(c) 0 .0192 0 .0290 0
C/Q .4 132(d) .345 9(d) .4304. .3729 .1215 .1220
T 82.23(e) 67.54(e) 101.64 70.20 55.66 30.74
Cr b)  1032.9 2738.5 942.7 2364.1 404.3 954.7
Age .0482 .0634 .0493 .0636 .0043 .0060
NW .1143 .1253 .1131 .1164 .1424 .1244
Male .4926 .4867 .4957 .4893 .0094 .0082
Urb .6986 .7348 .6189 .6619 .1494 .1444
Enr .822 .869 .8453 .8873 .0641 .0456
Pop(') 180.0 203.8 3.324 3.766 4.142 4.791
Div .0022 .0035 .0031 .0042 .0049 .0029
Y 660 9586 5418 9172 1002 1467
Pov .184 .107 .1970 .1154 .0962 .0524
Emp .4486 .4991 .4250 .4815 .0657 .0588
S .3333 .3333 .2813 .2813 .4568 .4568
(a) Means and standard deviations are unweighted statistics for the 32 states
for which no data were missing or undefined; (b) per 100,000 residents;
(c) based on 48 states (Alaska and New Jersey did not report these statistics
in 1960); (d) based on the 33 states that reported in both 1960 and 1970;
(e) based on data from 34 states; (f) in millions; (g) based on income earned
in the previous year.
* Aggregate U.S. values are used only in these two columns, in Figure 1, and
in the concluding section of this paper.
Following the rationale described in the preceding section,
the effects of interest are estimated by forming the equation of
first differences:
40. A rationale for the inclusion of the nonhomicide crime rate is
given in Klein, Forst, & Filatov, supra note 13, at 17-19, and in text
accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
41. It has become a standard practice in cross-state econometric
analysis to incorporate a binary Southern variable to reflect other social
and demographic characteristics. The use of such a variable in an
analysis of homicides is further warranted by the fact that the homicide
rates in the South are about twice that of the rest of the nation.
[Vol. 61: 743
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(2) A(Q/N) = a + bA(E/C) + b2A(C/Q) + b3AT + cACr +
c2AAge + c3ANW + c4tAMale + c5AUrb + c6AEnr +
c7APop + c8ADiv + c9AY + cj0APov + cnAEmp +
c 12 S,
where A denotes the change in a variable calculated by subtract-
ing the 1960 level from the 1970 level, "a" denotes a constant term,
b, denotes a partial differential coefficient for a sanction variable,
and ej denotes a partial differential coefficient for a control var-
iable.
B. PARAmETm ESTIMATES
These coefficients can be estimated using ordinary least-
squares regression analysis, with the full set of independent vari-
ables incorporated as regressors. These estimates are based on
data from the 32 states42 for which values of all the variables
shown were reported both for 1960 and 1970:48
(3) (Q/N) = - 5.911 + 11.62A(E/C) - 5.714A(C/Q)
(R2=.692) (2.79) (12.7) (1.92)
+ . 001378AT - 38.68APov + .001796AY
(.00773) (15.8) (.00096)
+ .001430ACr + 36.97ANW - 189.2AAge
(.000692) (17.8) (139)
- .9595S - 29.65AEmp - 9.021AEnr
(.877) (34.2) (8.53)
+ 11.24AUrb + 92.58ADiv + .0000002382APop(15.5) (158) (.000000411)
+ OAMale .
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and R2 is the
coefficient of determination, a measure of the proportion of the
variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the inde-
pendent variables used. Thus, 69 percent of the cross-state
variance in the change in the homicide rate from 1960 to 1970
can be attributed to the set of variables in the right-hand side
of equation (3).
42. The 32 states on which these estimates are based are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dako-
ta, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Con-
viction data were missing for 17 states in 1970, and the average term of
incarceration was not available for an additional state (Vermont) in that
year.
43. Similar results are obtained when the 1960 level of the homi-
qidQ rate is included as a regressor to accoQnt for nQnlinearity in Q/N,
19771
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The first result provides no support for the hypothesis that
capital punishment deters homicide. The positive regression co-
efficient for the execution rate variable is, in fact, consistent with
a counterdeterrent effect,4 4 but the standard error of this esti-
mate is too large for this finding to be taken seriously.45 Equation
(3) does provide evidence, on the other hand, of a deterrent ef-
fect of convictions on homicides. Those states with the largest
reductions in the ratio of homicide convictions to homicide of-
fenses tended to have the largest increases in the homicide rate,
other factors held constant.
This regression equation, however, has too many short-
comings to allow it to stand alone as an adequate test of the de-
terrence hypothesis. Foremost among these is the imprecision in
parameter estimation caused by the inclusion of 15 independent
variables-ten of which are not significant (at the .10 level) -in
an equation constructed from only 32 observations.4 6 Eliminating
these ten variables, except for the variable of primary interest,
Ax (E/C), produces a result that fits the data better:
(4) A(Q/N)= - 4.222 + 17.64A(E/C) - 5.970A(C/Q)
(R2 =.577) (2.10) (8.55) (1.68)
- 24.91APov + .001515ACr + 39.60ANW(7.52) (.000507) (13.3)
+ .0004679AY.
(.000526)
44. Ehrlich explained the potential for a counterdeterrent effect
as follows: "[0]ne may argue that the differential deterrent effect
of capital punishment on the incentive to commit murder may be offset
by the added incentive it may create for those who actually commit this
crime to eliminate policemen and witnesses who can bring about their
apprehension and subsequent conviction and execution." Ehrlich, supra
note 3, at 398. Courts or juries may also be more reluctant "to convict
defendants charged with murder when the risk of their subsequent exe-
cution is perceived to be undesirably high." Id. at 405. This latter
possibility is discussed in text accompanying notes 57-59 infra. Von
Weber has suggested as an alternative explanation that capital punish-
ment may induce suicidally-inclined persons to commit murder. H. von
Weber, Selbstmord als Mordmotiv, MoNATsscmmRT Fft K ImINALBIOLOGM
uNn STmRFaRCHTSREFORM 161 (1937).
45. If executions had no effect on homicides, the probability is .37
that random factors alone would have caused the ratio of the regression
coefficient for (E/C) to its standard error to be at least 0.91, the result
in equation (3).
46. Estimates become increasingly precise (that is, subject to less
random error) either as the number of observations increases or as the
number of insignificant variables in the regression equation diminishes.
The importance of precision in the estimation of the deterrent effect of
capital punishment has been discussed by Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 220.
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This result is basically similar to (3) for the variables of principal
focus, except that elimination of nine weak independent variables
increases the adjusted coefficient of determination, a standard
measure of goodness-of-fit,47 from .44 to .48, and increases the
statistical significance of five of the six remaining variables.
Equation (4) provides evidence that the sharp increase in
the homicide rate during the 1960's was the product of factors
other than the abolition of the death penalty. Accounting for
what appear to be the most important of these other factors-
the murder conviction rate, economic variables, race, and the fac-
tors that caused non-capital offenses to escalate during the
1960's-it is apparent that those states in which the actual use
of capital punishment ceased during the 1960's experienced no
greater increase in the murder rate than did the states that did
not use capital punishment in the first place. Under the theory
that capital punishment deters murder, one would have predicted
the opposite.
C. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Before drawing inferences from data that are not produced
by controlled experimentation, it is appropriate to test whether
the estimates are "robust" to (that is, hold up under) departures
from the assumptions on which the estimates are grounded.48
Equation (4) is based on several assumptions: (1) the murder
rate in any given year is influenced by the number of executions
in that year; (2) none of the sanction variables is influenced by
any of the other variables used in the regression analysis; (3)
the variance in the homicide rate is no larger for highly popu-
lated states than for the less populated states; and (4) the rate
at which non-capital crimes are committed is not affected by,
nor does it affect, the other variables in the analysis. Each of
these assumptions can be altered to test for robustness, which
47. The formula for the adjusted coefficient of determination, ] is
2 
= R 2 - - R2)
where R2 is the coefficient of determination, K is the number of inde-
pendent variables, and N is the number of observations. A. GOLDBERGER,
ECONoMmIc THEORY 217 (1964).
48. The importance of robustness tests is well established in
econometric analysis. H. Tusi., PmNciPm=s OF ECONOMsETBCS 615-16
(1971).
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will indicate the reliability of the estimates obtained in equation
(4).
1. Alternative Constructions of the Execution Rate
Since the execution rate is the independent variable of prin-
cipal focus in this analysis, it is surely appropriate to vary the
methods of measuring it. 40 The construction used in equations
(3) and (4) is based on the number of executions and convictions
in 1960 and 1970. One alternative is to use executions in 1961
and 1971 instead of executions in 1960 and 1970, respectively, as
objective forecasts of the probability that a murder conviction
will lead to execution, since executions have been reported to lag
behind convictions by about a year.50 The result corresponding
to equation (4) using this alternative measure, which is denoted
(E+I/C), is
(5) A(Q/N) = - 5.391 + 2.977A(E+ I/C) - 5.637A(C/Q)
(R2 =.506) (2.21) (11.5) (1.83)
- 27.32APov + .001246ACr + 42.01ANW
(8.03) (.000571) (15.3)
+ .0007516AY
(.000565)
This result is fundamentally no different from equation (4), sug-
gesting that lagging executions does not alter the observed effect
of executions on homicides. 51
To reduce the sampling error associated with the small num-
ber of executions that occurred around 1960 and test another lag
structure, one can make the numerator of the execution rate the
average number of executions over the three-consecutive-year
49. The potential importance of alternative constructions has been
stressed in previous analyses of the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 407-08; Passell, supra note 24, at 68, 75,
77.
50. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 407. Using data from the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, I calculated that the median delay between sentence
and execution for persons executed during the period 1956 through 1959
was 14 months. The distribution is skewed in the positive direction, in-
dicating a mean delay of somewhat more than 14 months. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STA-
TIsTIcs: EXECUTIONS 1 (No. 23, February 1960).
51. The decline in R2 from equation (4) to (5) might be regarded
as evidence that the homicide rate is less sensitive to variation in lagged
executions than to variation in current executions. More fundamentally,
however, it appears systematically related to neither.
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period centered about the year of the convictions in the denom-
inator.52 This execution rate variable is denoted (E,,/C), and is
used in place of (E/C) in equation (4), giving
(6) A(Q/N)= - 5.092 + 15.89A(E,/C) - 5.623A(C/Q)
(R2=.525) (2.16) (15.4) (1.78)
- 26.83APov + .001403ACr + 40.57ANW
(7.88) (.000551) (14.2)
+ .0006700AY
(.000545)
Again, this alternative does not produce a result that differs in
any important respects from equation (4).
Another execution rate variable can be formed by combining.
the independent variables (E/C) and (C/Q) into the single vari-
able (E/Q). Although this combination causes an important con-
trol variable, the murder conviction rate, to be lost, it allows all
50 states to be included in the analysis.53 The result is
(7) A(Q/N)= - 2.161 + 13.17A(E/Q) - 13.38APov(W=.321) (1.89) (30.1) (6.82)
+ .001441ACr + 35.00ANW + .0001917AY
(.000460) (13.4) (.000445)
This result is remarkably similar to equation (4) except for the
substantial reduction in the proportion of variance in the homi-
cide rate explained by the independent variables, which is pro-
duced by the exclusion of the conviction variable and the use
of a larger number of observations. This reduction provides
further support for the hypothesis that convictions deter homi-
cides, consistent with findings by Ehrlich54 and Passel 5 5 and
with the results of equations (3) through (6).
A final construction of the execution rate is designed to
eliminate whatever bias results from the reverse effect that
changes in the homicide rate may have on the execution rate.
All of the above regression equations assume that the causality
runs strictly from executions to homicides. These results will be
biased to the extent that the execution rate is a function of the
52. This idea comes from Passell, supra note 24, at 68, who used
instead a four-year average of executions.
53. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
54. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 410-11. Ehrlich's findings suggest that
arrests, convictions, and executions each independently deter the com-
mission of homicides, with arrests appearing to have the strongest effect
and executions the weakest.
55. Passell, supra note 24, at 69-71.
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homicide rate, which would occur, for example, if the demand
for capital punishment was stimulated by an increase in the
homicide rate. This bias can be reduced by replacing the vari-
able A (E/C) with the estimator A (E/C), formed separately
by regressing A (E/C) on all the predetermined variables in
Table L.-5 This alternative produces the result
(8) A(Q/N) - 3.841 + 23.05A°(E/C) - 6.003A(C/Q)
(2.24) (12.8) (1.71)
- 23.69APov + .001527ACr + 38.39ANW
(7.82) (.000525) (13.7)
+ .0004168AY
(.000551)
which, again, is basically the same as the other equations. Thus,
the major finding-that decreases in the execution rate are not
associated with increases in the homicide rate-is robust with
respect to alternative methods of constructing the execution rate
variable.
2. Alternative Structures of Simultaneity
Although equation (1) assumes that the causation is unidi-
rectional, some variables in the equation may be both determin-
ants of murder and products of either the homicide rate itself or
factors that influence the homicide rate. This phenomenon,
known generally as "simultaneity," was assumed in equation (8).
One variable other than the execution rate that may be deter-
mined simultaneously with the homicide rate is the rate at
which homicide offenders are convicted; it may both affect the
homicide rate, as is hypothesized in equation (1), and be pro-
duced by changes in the homicide rate. The latter would occur
if, for example, the ability to convict homicide offenders was
56. The predetermined variables are AAge, ANW, AMale, AUrb,
AEnr, APop, ADiv, AY, APov, AEmp, and S. An alternate estimator,
constructed from these variables together with ACr, produced a similar
result. This general method, called the "two-stage, least-squares regres-
sion technique," is described in most standard econometrics textbooks.
Because the coefficient of determination, described at equation (3), is
difficult to interpret under the application of this technique, it is not
reported for equations (8), (9), and (10). See P. DHRYMES, ECONOMET-
RuCS: STATISTICAL FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 240-63 (1970). Appli-
cation of this technique to the analysis of crime deterrence, however,
may create problems, since one cannot be confident that the control
variables included in the equation of primary interest actually permit
accurate identification of the crime function. Fisher & Nagin, On the
Feasibility of Identifying the Crime Function in a Simultaneous Model
of Crime Rates and Sanction Levels, in DuETEuNcz AND INcApACITATIoN,
supra note 13,
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hampered by an increase in the load of homicide cases. Failure
to account for this reverse effect, or for the effect of changes in
the execution rate on the conviction rate,57 might bias all the
regression coefficients estimated. To deal with this problem, the
estimator A* (C/Q) is constructed by regressing A (C/Q) on the
predetermined variables. 5s This alternative measure of the con-
viction rate produces the equation
(9) A(Q/N)= - 4.967 + 17.68A(EIC) - 7.634A°(C/Q)
(3.62) (10.4) (6.63)
- 27.13APov + .001390ACr + 42.38ANW
(13.3) (.000620) (18.9)
+ .0006379AY
(.000767)
Once again, the homicide rate appears unaffected by changes in
the execution rate.59
Another type of simultaneity may exist with regard to the
average term of incarceration served by persons convicted of
homicide, T. This would result if, for example, sentences were
lengthened in response to an increase in the homicide rate, in an
attempt to discourage further homicides. The potential bias pro-
duced by this simultaneity can be reduced by forming the vari-
able A°T, constructed by regressing AT on the predetermined
variables.6 0 The result produced under this construction is
(10) A(Q/N)= - 4.566 + 17.08A(E/C) - 6.019A(C/Q)
(2.12) (8.55) (1.68)
+ .008252A*T - 26.68APov + .001383ACr
(.00788) (7.69) (.000521)
+ 44.72ANW + .0006326AY
(14.1) (.000548)
This result is basically similar to the others reported above.
The true system of simultaneity among variables is likely
to be considerably more complicated than has been hypothesized.
The results obtained by treating the execution rate, the convic-
tion rate, and the average term of incarceration as endogenous
variables, however, as was done in equations (8), (9), and (10),
respectively, indicate that the biases due to failure to capture
57. See note 44 supra.
58. The predetermined variables under this formulation include
those already cited, supra note 56, and A (E/C).
59. Alternative estimators of A (C/Q), one formed without A (E/C)
and another formed with ACr, produce similar results.
60. See note 58 supra.
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these simultaneous effects in equations (3) and (4) are not
large.61
3. Use of Weighted Regression&
In cross-section analysis the variance of the dependent vari-
able is often larger for more heavily populated places. This
condition, known in a more general form as "heteroscedasticity,"
produces biased estimates of standard errors of the regression
coefficients and biased tests of statistical significance. The pres-
ence of heteroscedasticity is commonly identified by visual in-
spection of a plot of the data, although more rigorous methods
are available.62  To eliminate this bias each observation is gen-
erally adjusted by weighting it by the square root of the popula-
tion.. Applying this weighting technique to the observations,
under equation (4), the result is
(11) A(Q/N) = - 4.927 + 18.596(E/C) - 6.349A(C/Q)
(R2=.595) (2.54) (10.6) (1.89)
- 26.49APov + .001243ACr + 50.32ANW
(8.91) (.000476) (15.8)
+ .007042AY
(.000564)
The similarity of this equation to equation (4) suggests that the
general findings are robust with respect to conventional weight-
ing.63
4. Exclusion of the Other-Crimes Variable
One of the control variables used in equations (1) through
(11) is the rate at which crimes other than homicide are com-
mitted. It was included in an attempt to account for the factors
that caused crime to increase generally during the 1960's, since
the -failure of previous analyses to capture these effects may have
interfered substantially with their ability to isolate a pure deter-
rent effect of capital punishment.64 Certain offenses incorporated
in this control variable, however, are likely to differ from hom-
icide only in that the victims did not die. Since it is possible
61. Similar results are obtained by endogenizing the rate at which
crimes other than homicide are committed.
62. See Goldfeld & Quandt, Some Tests for Homoscedasticity, 60 J.
A . STAT. Ass'N 539 (1965).
63. All the unweighted regression results reported in this paper
have also been obtained under the weighted technique, with similar
results in each instance.
64. See note 40 supra.
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that some nonhomicide offenses may themselves be deterred by
capital punishment, having them in the right-hand side of the
regression equation may have affected the estimates of the deter-
rent effect that were reported above.
It is possible to test the effect of this potential bias, whose
direction is not obvious, a priori, by estimating'a counterpart to
equation (4) without other offenses as a control variable.6 5 The
result is
(12) A(QIN)= - 5.371 + 9.564A(EIC) - 6.040A(C/Q)
(R2=.426) (2.36) (9.27) (1.92)
- 19.90APov + 42.72ANW + .001412AY
(8.37) (15.1) (.000480)
As before, the deterrent effect of capital punishment is not ap-
parent. While the omission of factors that caused crimes other
than homicide to increase during the 1960's produces a result that
differs somewhat from equation (4),00 it does not, in this anal-
ysis, materially alter the finding.
III. CONCLUSION
The aim of this Article was to investigate empirically the
deterrent effect of capital punishment. Building on studies by
Ehrlich 7 and Passell, 8 the influence of the execution rate on the
homicide rate was estimated by controlling for the effects of
other variables and for the reverse effects of the homicide rate on
the sanction variables. This analysis differs from previous ones,
however, both because it focuses on a unique decade during
which the homicide rate increased by over 50 percent and the use
of capital punishment ceased and because it examines changes
in homicides and executions over time and across states.6 9
65. When ACr is removed from equation (3) the only independent
variables that are statistically significant (at .10) are A(C/Q), APov,
ANW, and AY. Hence, our selection of an efficient subset of independ-
ent variables, used in equations (4) through (11), is unaffected by the
exclusion of ACr.
66. The inclusion of ACr in equation (4) reduces substantially the
appearance of a strong effect of median family income on the homicide
rate obtained in (12). Behind this reduction is a large correlation
coefficient (.65) for the pair ACr and AY. The actual relationships be-
tween (Q/N), Cr, Y, and other factbrs are likely to be extraordinarily
complex, and, although the topic is important, exploration of these
relationships is beyond the scope of this discussion.
67. See Ehrlich, supra note 3; Ehrlich, Punishment and Deterrence,
supra note 24.
68. See Passell, supra note 24.
69. This approach appears also to yield more efficient estimates of
1977]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The findings do not support the hypothesis that capital
punishment deters homicides. The 53 percent increase in the
homicide rate in the United States from 1960 to 1970 appears to
be the product of factors other than the elimination of capital
punishment. Foremost among these are a decline in the rate at
which homicide offenses resulted in imprisonment (from 41.3 per-
cent in 1960 to 34.6 percent in 1970 for the states that reported
in both years) and increasing affluence during the 1960's.70
To obtain a sense of how well the estimates, based as they
are on individual observations of 32 states, generalize to the
United States as a whole, the coefficients of the basic equation,
(4), can be combined with changes in the respective independent
variables given in the first two columns of Table 1. This pro-
duces a predicted increase of 2.68 homicides per 100,000 residents.
That the actual increase was 2.7, as shown in Table 1, provides
some assurance that the estimates generalize to the aggregate of
18 states not analyzed in equation (4).
The apparent strength of the incarceration rate variable and
the apparent weakness of the execution rate and term of im-
the relationship of primary interest, based on the coefficients of varia-
tion of the relevant variables. A variable's coefficient of variation is the
ratio of its standard deviation to its mean value. In the extreme case
in which a factor does not vary, it can have no relationship at all with
another factor.
In fact, the coefficients of variation of both the homicide rate and
the execution rate are substantially larger (0.923 and 1.51, respectively)
in this study than the coefficients of variation for the homicide rate
(0.157) and execution rate (0.946) based on annual aggregate United
States data for the period 1933 to 1969. The coefficients of variation for
the aggregate time-series data are calculated from the independent con-
structions of Q/N and PXQ1, based on Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, Sources of Data
at 2, 6 (May 1975) (unpublished paper on file at IVIINNESOTA LAW RE-
vWw).
70. One can only speculate as to why the homicide rate rose the
most in those states with the greatest increases in wealth. Increased
wealth may have provided more attractive targets to potential offenders,
and produced heightened expectations and frustration. Since the nation-
wide increases in family income reported here are attributable to real
growth and to inflation in roughly equal shares, see U.S. BUREAu OF
CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 1323, at 811
(1972) & Table 1, at p. 752 supra, the inflation component may have pro-
duced further frustration, thereby exerting additional upward pressure
on the homicide rate. According to table 1323, the Consumer Price
Index went from 88.7 to 116.3 between 1960 and 1970, an increase of
31.1 percent. During the same period the median family income rose
from $5660 to $9586, see Table 1, at p. 752 supra (values for variable Y),
an increase of 67.6 percent. Thus, the percentage increase in the median
family income due to inflation was 46.0.
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prisonment variables as deterrents to homicide lend some support
to Cesare Beccaria's two-hundred-year-old suggestion that cer-
tainty of punishment deters more effectively than its severity."'
There are, however, other explanations for these findings. The
appearance of a strong deterrent effect of imprisonments on hom-
icides may be the result of changes in factors omitted from
this analysis.7 2 And the apparent weakness of the deterrent effect
of long imprisonments may be the product of the inaccuracy of
our term-of-imprisonment variable 7 3 since random errors in the
measurement of this variable will bias downward estimates of the
deterrent effect of the length of imprisonment.
It seems likely, nonetheless, that this finding of a deterrent
effect of imprisonments of persons convicted of murder is more
real than spurious. Errors in the measure of murder imprison-
ments are sure to exist, and these are likely to cause estimates
of the deterrent effect of incarceration to understate the true
effect. 4  Moreover, this particular finding is consistent with
empirical results presented by Ehrlich and Passell.75 And it
supports von Hirsch's suggestion that if penalties for homicide
were eliminated entirely it is difficult to imagine that the homi-
cide rate would not increase.7 6
The finding that capital punishment, on the other hand, does
not deter homicide is remarkably robust with respect to a wide
range of alternative constructions of the execution rate, alter-
native assumptions about simultaneity among the crime and
71. C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNIsIMnETsr 58 (H. Paolucci trans.
1963).
72. Suppose, for example, that exogenous changes in omitted social
factors in the 1960's produced a disproportionate increase in stranger-to-
stranger homicides. This would cause an increase in the homicide rate
to coincide with a decrease in the imprisonment rate, since it is harder
to apprehend those who commit stranger-to-stranger homicides. The
appearance of a deterrent effect would then be false.
73. Passell, supra note 24, at 67, has discussed potential sources of
error in the measurement of this variable. A particularly important
potential source of error comes from the fact that the measure of the
average term of imprisonment is based on released homicide offenders,
exclusive of homicide offenders who die in prison, some of whom had
surely already served lengthy terms of incarceration.
74. On the other hand, errors in the measurement of the number
of homicides, which appears both as the numerator of the homicide rate,
(Q/N), and the denominator of the conviction rate, (C/Q), are likely to
bias the estimates toward the appearance of a stronger deterrent effect
of incarceration than may really exist. Klein, Forst, & Filatov, supra
note 13, at 17-19.
75. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
76. A. VON HmscH, DOING JusTicE 39 (1976).
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sanction variables, whether or not the observations are weighted,
and the inclusion of different subsets of available control vari-
ables.
Capital punishment may be a justly deserved and appropri-
ate sanction in some instances. It is certainly an effective way
to ensure that a person convicted of murder will not commit
further crimes. The results of this analysis suggest, however,
that it is erroneous to view capital punishment as a means of
reducing the homicide rate.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
APPENDIX
DATA SOURCES FOR THE VARIABLES USED IN TIS ANALYSIS
Q/N Criminal Homicide Rate = Number of murders and non-
negligent manslaughters per 100,000 residents. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIMIE REPORTS, table 3, at 38-52 (1960) & table 4, at 72-81
(1970).
E/C Execution Rate = Ratio of the number of executions to the
number of homicide prisoners received from court. E/C
denotes the ratio of executions to murder convictions that
occur in the same year. E+ 1/C denotes the ratio of execu-
tions to convictions, with the executions occurring the
year after convictions. Em/C denotes the ratio of execu-
tions to convictions, where Em is the mean annual number
of executions over the three-year period centered about
the year of the convictions. The source of the number of
executions is FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, table 2, at 8-9 (No. 45, August 1969) for 1960 and
1961 data, and table 2, at 18-19 (No. SD-NPS-CP-3, Novem-
ber 1975) and table 3 (No. 20, February 1959) for the con-
struction of 1959 data. The source of the number of
homicide prisoners received from the court in 1960 is
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS: CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE
PRISONERS, table A5, at 50-51 (1960); the source of the
1970 data is FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, STATE PRISONERS:
ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, table A2, at 6 (1970).
C/Q Incarceration Rate = Ratio of the number of homicide
prisoners received from court to the number of murders
and nonnegligent manslaughters. The source of the num-
ber of homicide prisoners received from the court is given
under E/C. The number of murders and nonnegligent
manslaughters is calculated as the criminal homicide rate,
described under Q/N, multiplied by the resident popula-
tion. The source of the resident population is U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 11, at 12 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as CENSUS ABSTRACT].
T Term of Incarceration = Mean time, in months, served by
homicide prisoners released from prison (including pa-
roles). Calculated from data given in FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, DEPARTM~ENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STA-
TISTICS: PRISONERS RELEASED FROM STATE AND FEDERAL IN-
STITUTIONS, tables 6-54, at 22-70 (1960) and FEDERAL BUREAU
OF PRISONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER
STATISTICS, STATE PRISoNERS: ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES,
table R4, at 47-81 (1970).
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Cr Nonhomicide Crime Rate = Number of offenses other than
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter reported to police
per 100,000 residents, calculated as the total crime index
rate minus the criminal homicide rate described under
Q/N. The sources of the total crime index rate data are
the same tables that were cited under the description of
Q/N.
Age Proportion of Residents of the Ages 21-24 = Ratio of the
number of residents of the ages 21 through 24 to the total
resident population. The source of the number of persons
of the ages 21-24 for 1960 is CENsus ABSTRACT, supra, table
19, at 27 (1962); the source of the 1970 data is CENsus AB-
sTRAcT, supra, table 36, at 31 (1972). The Census Bureau
gives the 1960 data for persons between the ages 20-24,
which we multiply by 0.8. The source of the total resident
population is given under C/Q.
NW Proportion of Nonwhites = Ratio of the number of non-
white residents to the total resident population. The
source of the number of nonwhite residents is CENsus AB-
STRACT, supra, table 31, at 29 (1974). The source of the
total resident population is given under C/Q.
Male Proportion of Males = Ratio of the number of male resi-
dents to the total resident population. The source of the
number of male residents is CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra, table
17, at 25 (1962) & table 25, at 25 (1972). The source of the
total Tesident population is given under C/Q.
Urb Proportion of Urban Residents = Ratio of urban popula-
tion to the total resident population. The source of the ur-
ban population is CENsUS ABSTRACT, supra, table 18, at 19(1974). The source of the total resident population is given
under C/Q.
Enr Enrollment Rate = Ratio of the number of persons en-
rolled in public elementary and secondary schools to the
number of residents of the ages 5-17. CENSUS ABSTRACT,
supra, table 196, at 122 (1974).
Pop Resident Population - Number of residents, in millions,
as of July 1. CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra, table 11, at 12 (1974).
Div Divorce Rate = Ratio of the number of divorces to the
number of residents. The source of the number of divorces
is CENsus ABSTRACT, supra, table 95, at 67 (1974). The
source of the number of residents is given under C/Q.
Y Median Family Income = Amount of income, in dollars,
such that exactly half the resident families earn at least
that much. CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra, table 627, at 387
(1974).
Pov Proportion of Families in Poverty = Ratio of the number
of families below the low income level to the total number
of resident families. CENsus ABSTRACT, supra, table 634, at
391 (1974).
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Emp Proportion of Adults Employed = Ratio of the number of
residents employed in nonagricultural establishments to
the number of residents at least 16 years of age. The
source of the number of employed residents is CENsus AB-
STRACT, supra, table 363, at 226 (1972). The number of resi-
dents at least 16 years of age is calculated from the CENSUS
ABSTRAcT, supra, table 19, at 27 (1962) & table 36, at 31
(1972), as follows: For 1960 we use the resident population
at least twenty years of age plus 0.8 times the number of
residents between 15 and 19 years of age. For 1970 we use
the resident population at least 18 years of age plus one-
half the number of residents between 14 and 17 years of
age.
S Binary Southern Variable =1 if the state is Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, or West Vir-
ginia; otherwise = 0.

